Real Estate Investment by Bank Holding Companies and Their Risk and Return: Nonparametric and GARCH Procedures by Deacle, Scott & Elyasiani, Elyas
Ursinus College
Digital Commons @ Ursinus College
Business and Economics Faculty Publications Business and Economics Department
5-21-2014
Real Estate Investment by Bank Holding
Companies and Their Risk and Return:





Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ursinus.edu/bus_econ_fac
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Economics Commons, Finance and Financial
Management Commons, Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons, and the Real Estate Commons
Click here to let us know how access to this document benefits you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business and Economics Department at Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Business and Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Ursinus College. For
more information, please contact aprock@ursinus.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deacle, Scott and Elyasiani, Elyas, "Real Estate Investment by Bank Holding Companies and Their Risk and Return: Nonparametric






Real Estate Investment by Bank Holding Companies and their  
Risk and Return: Non-Parametric and GARCH Procedures 
 
1. Introduction 
The deregulation movement in the U.S. banking industry in the last three decades has 
been far-reaching. For example, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act (1994) permitted Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) to acquire banks in other states and 
allowed FDIC-insured banks to branch interstate, subject to some restrictions. Similarly, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 allowed commercial banks, investment banks, and 
insurance companies to combine to form financial services holding companies. In brief, the 
former act relaxed the rules on geographic diversification while the latter allowed product 
diversification.1  
The trend in deregulation in the U.S. stopped short of allowing commercial banks to 
engage in extensive real estate activities such as developing real estate, purchasing real estate for 
resale, or providing real estate brokerage services -- activities permitted in other countries, e.g., 
in Canada and Germany.2 In the U.S., federal statutes and some state laws severely restrict real 
estate activity by banks and BHCs, although they do not entirely prohibit it. All banks and BHCs 
are allowed to own real estate for current and future operations. The degree of restriction beyond 
that differs depending on whether the institution is a BHC, a national bank (NB), a state-
                                                 
1 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 requires the Federal Reserve to restrict 
proprietary trading of securities, commodities, and derivatives by BHCs and forbids BHCs from investing in hedge 
funds and private equity firms. It does not, however, re-impose restrictions on interstate branching or ownership of 
investment banks and insurance companies that were relaxed in 1999. See H.R. 4173--111th Congress: Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. (2010). Available at: 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h4173enr.txt.pdf 
2 Recent World Bank surveys of national differences in bank regulations, including restrictions on real estate 






chartered Federal Reserve-member bank (SMB), or a state-chartered Federal Reserve-non-
member bank (SNMB). 
Federal Reserve Regulation Y authorizes BHCs to engage in investment in real estate for 
purposes other than operations only with the permission of the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors. Similarly, Federal Reserve Regulation H authorizes SMBs to invest in real estate for 
purposes other than operations only with the Board’s prior approval. The National Bank Act of 
1864 allows NBs to own real estate only for bank operations, as payment for loans (with a five-
year time limit on such ownership) or if the real estate was acquired as a result of a default.3 The 
least restrictive rules apply to SNMBs that are chartered in states that have relatively lenient 
rules on bank real estate investment. According to data supplied to the authors by the Conference 
of State Bank Supervisors, 39 states and the District of Columbia allow banks to either take 
equity stakes in real estate, develop real estate, or both.  SNMBs in the remaining 11 states and 
Puerto Rico follow rules similar to or more restrictive than those followed by NBs and SMBs. 
The various real estate investment rules are summarized in Table 1. 
In theory, real estate investment can have both positive and negative effects on BHC 
performance. Among the potential benefits are diversification of cash flows, economies of scale 
and/or scope (cost complementarity) and greater charter values.4 The potential downsides are 
threefold. First, real estate investment returns may be more volatile than returns from traditional 
banking assets, thus raising, rather than lowering, overall BHC risk. Second, insufficient 
expertise may result in poor real estate investment and real estate management choices by BHCs, 
                                                 
3 See the following links for information on the cited laws and regulations:  
U.S. Code Title 12 Section 29 (National Bank Act section on real estate ownership by national banks): 
vlex.com/vid/sec-power-hold-real-property-19225851. 
Federal Reserve Regulations H and Y: www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm. 





harming their return and risk performance. Third, greater complexity of BHCs that invest in real 
estate may make them more opaque and complicate their regulation and monitoring.  
The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the effects of real estate investment 
by BHCs operating in the U.S. on their stock returns; total risk (conditional variance of their 
stock returns); risk-adjusted stock returns (the Sharpe ratio); and market risk (market betas of the 
stocks). This study focuses on real estate investment activity outside of traditional real estate 
lending such as residential and commercial mortgage loans. The real estate business studied here 
includes the limited activities allowed by federal authorities as well as the more extensive 
activity allowed in 39 states and the District of Columbia. The non-parametric Wilcoxon 
procedure and an extended generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) 
framework of analysis are employed to conduct the tests.  
Three sets of BHC stock portfolios are formed according to: i) investment versus non-
investment in real estate, ii) investment in real estate under lenient versus strict regulatory 
constraints, and iii) the ratio of real estate investment to total assets. Portfolios based on BHCs 
that do and do not invest in real estate are used to test the hypothesis whether the risks, returns 
and risk-adjusted returns of the two groups are identical. Portfolios formed according to the type 
of regulation under which BHCs invest in real estate -- lenient or strict -- enable us to test 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between the type of regulation and the returns and risk of 
BHCs. Portfolios based on the real estate investment to total assets ratio are used to examine 
hypotheses concerning the effects of changes in the real estate investment ratio on BHC return 
and risk performance. 
Several results are obtained. First, we provide evidence that real estate investment has a 





tests, we find that BHCs investing in real estate show lower returns and risk-adjusted returns and 
greater total risk than BHCs not investing in real estate.  Second, and similarly, portfolios of 
BHCs that invest in real estate under lenient rules have lower returns and risk-adjusted returns 
and greater total risk than portfolios of BHCs that invest under stricter rules. Third, among BHCs 
investing in real estate, portfolios of BHCs with higher shares of real estate relative to total assets 
have returns and total risks that are statistically identical to those of BHCs with lower shares. 
Using the GARCH framework, we find evidence indicating that the portfolio of BHCs with 
above-median shares of real estate relative to total assets has lower returns and greater market 
risk, compared to BHCs positioned below the sample median in terms of real estate holding.  
These results are evidence that benefits from diversification, economies of scale, 
economies of scope, and increases in charter value associated with real estate investment are 
outweighed by greater variability of returns on real estate investment, lack of BHC expertise in 
real estate investment and greater BHC complexity due to engagement in real estate. If these 
results can be generalized to larger and wider levels of activity in real estate by banks, the 
implication for policy makers would be that allowing BHCs to enter the field of real estate or 
loosening the restrictions on such activities would enable BHCs to take greater risks that do not 
result in corresponding increases in returns. Because the amount of real estate investment as a 
percentage of the total assets of the BHCs is relatively small in our sample, the current results 
should not be taken as ruling out the possibility of a threshold level of real estate investment 
above which BHCs would indeed exhibit significant benefits from development of expertise and 
economies of scale within the field of real estate investment in the longer-run.  
This study focuses on the banking industry rather than other industries, and we caution 





least of which is that data on the real estate holdings of U.S. firms in other industries are not 
available. The activities of banks and BHCs are also of particular concern due to the possibility 
of a contagion effect in the financial services industry and subsequent externalities in the 
economy’s real sector, an example of which was observed during the financial crisis of 2007 to 
2009. Finally, as banking is one of the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy, policy 
makers also have an interest in evidence regarding the effects of the numerous rules governing 
bank behavior. Indeed, much of the debate over bank regulation has revolved around questions 
of which industries to allow banks to enter, as with debate over GLBA’s repeal of Glass-Steagall 
Act (1933) restrictions on insurance and investment banking activity by commercial banking 
companies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the theoretical 
underpinnings of the subject of real estate investment by banks and reviews the literature. 
Section 3 and 4 describe the data and methodology, respectively, Section 5 develops the 
hypotheses to be tested and Section 6 presents the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Theory and Literature Review   
Diversification of BHCs into real estate activities can produce several effects. According 
to modern portfolio theory (Lintner, 1965; Markowitz, 1959; Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964), if 
returns from real estate and non-real estate activities are not perfectly correlated, BHC portfolios’ 
efficient frontiers will shift above the traditional banking frontier, resulting in greater returns for 
each level of risk. Fewer regulatory restrictions on real estate activities would also allow banks 
and BHCs to more easily engage in these endeavors and to take advantage of economies of scale 
and scope, as argued in Claessens and Klingebiel (2000), and to overcome indivisibilities of the 





values compared to firms that are prevented from entering these activities (Ramirez, 2002), and 
may then, in turn, give banks incentives to reduce risk in order to preserve the higher charter 
value (Acharya, Santos, & Yorulmazer, 2010). 
On the other hand, investment in real estate by BHCs may increase their riskiness because 
returns from real estate activity may exhibit greater variance than returns from traditional banking 
activities such as intermediation (Rosen, Lloyd-Davies, Kwast, & Humphrey, 1989).  In addition, 
by investing in real estate, banks and BHCs may enter an area in which they have little expertise, 
exposing themselves to considerable downside risk and the possibility of failure. Finally, by 
engaging in non-traditional activities including real estate investment, banks become more complex 
and, hence, more opaque, which in turn makes them more difficult for regulators and investors to 
monitor, possibly resulting in greater risk (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004). 
Empirical research must answer the question of whether real estate investment by BHCs 
results in a net improvement in performance. Previous studies on the effects of real estate 
investment by depository institutions in the U.S. have used data from thrifts in the 1980s, a 
period of deregulation in that sector. Rosen et al. (1989) analyze 1980-1985 data on returns on 
direct investments in real estate assets by thrift service corporations,5 market equity returns of 
real estate investment trusts (REITs), and profits of commercial banks that operated under strict 
restrictions on real estate investment. In their analysis, the low correlation between returns on 
real-estate and non-real-estate assets is outweighed by the greater variability of real estate returns 
when real estate investment exceeds a relatively low threshold of around 4 percent of total assets.  
McKenzie, Cole, and Brown (1992) estimate the average returns on a set of 
nontraditional assets, including real estate, in which thrifts were allowed to invest following the 
                                                 
5 Thrift service corporations are subsidiaries of thrift holding companies that are authorized to engage in any activity 





passage of the 1980 Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) 
and the 1982 Garn-St. Germain Act. Based on data from one-year periods ending on June 30, 
1987 and June 30, 1988,6 they find that average returns on real estate investment were 
significantly lower than those on traditional assets, although they admit that during their sample 
period real estate investments in general performed poorly, especially for capital-deficient 
institutions. The authors explain this finding by arguing that since the deposit insurance system 
for thrifts was not risk-based at the time, thrifts managers of capital-deficient thrifts found it 
attractive to acquire high-risk, high-potential-return assets. They had little to lose, as any losses 
would be borne by the deposit insurance fund, a situation of moral hazard. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (1991) now requires the FDIC to set premiums based 
on risk (Acharya et al., 2010).  
As is well-known, the 1980s ended in crisis for the U.S. thrift industry, with regulators 
closing or placing into receivership more than 1,000 thrifts. Several authors (Cole, 1993; Cole, 
McKenzie, & White, 1990; Pantalone & Platt, 1987; Rudolph & Hamden, 1988) show that these 
failed institutions held large shares of non-traditional assets -- including equity stakes in 
commercial real estate -- in their portfolios, compared with well-capitalized thrifts. Using data 
from 1984 to 1989, Cole and McKenzie (1994) find that well-capitalized thrifts chose portfolios 
that were close to their efficient frontiers in order to protect their equity capital, while insolvent 
thrifts chose high-risk, high-return portfolios that ex post produced returns far below the efficient 
frontier. Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) simulate mergers of randomly selected BHCs and 
non-bank firms to examine the effect of expansion into non-bank activities. They find that BHC 
                                                 
6 The authors chose the dates to reduce the effects on returns of the high initial costs of investing in nontraditional 





risk usually increases from simulated mergers with firms in real estate and real estate 
development.  
Other related studies focus on the expansion of the U.S. commercial banks and BHCs 
into non-traditional banking activities without specifically examining real estate investment. 
Boyd and Graham (1986) examine the effect of BHC expansion into nonbank activities 
permitted by the Federal Reserve using data from 1971 to 1983. They find that from 1971 to 
1977, when the Federal Reserve’s regulatory policy was more permissive, BHCs’ degree of 
involvement in non-banking activity was positively associated with risk, measured by the 
standard deviation of BHCs’ returns on assets (ROA) and BHC Z-scores.7 On the contrary, they 
find no statistically significant relationship between the extent of non-bank activity and risk over 
the 1978-1983 period, when Federal Reserve regulation was more stringent. Wall (1987) 
examines data on BHCs with nonbank subsidiaries and finds that these subsidiaries tend to 
increase (decrease) the risk of BHCs with less risky (highly risky) banks. Similarly, Brewer 
(1989) studies BHC stock market data from 1978 to 1986 and finds a weak negative relationship 
between BHC risk and level of non-banking activity, where the former is measured by the 
volatility of BHC stock returns and the latter by one minus the ratio of the BHCs total banking 
assets to total assets. Stiroh (2004) finds that greater reliance on noninterest income – a category 
that includes fiduciary income, service charges, trading revenue, and fees – is associated with 
higher risk and lower risk-adjusted profits at U.S. commercial banks from 1978 to 2001. Using 
data from U.S. financial holding companies from 1997 to 2002, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) report 
that gains from diversification made possible by deregulation are more than offset by the costs of 
increased exposure to volatile activities.  
                                                 
7 The Z-score measures the probability that a BHC will fail or alternatively the number of standard deviations below 





Several studies have used international data to test the effects of restrictions on banking 
activity on bank performance. Barth et al. (2004) compute an index of national restrictions on 
banking activity that accounts for restraints on real estate investment as well as securities 
investment and ownership of non-financial firms. They include this index with other independent 
variables in regression models of various bank risk indicators. With data from 107 countries 
from the 1990s and early 2000s, they find that greater banking activity restriction is associated 
with a greater likelihood of a banking crisis.  
Gonzales (2005) tests the effects of restrictions on banking activity using a data set of 
251 banks in 36 countries from 1995 to 1999. He finds that banks in countries with greater 
restrictions on banking activities have lower charter values, after controlling for the presence of 
deposit insurance, the quality of countries’ rule of law, the historic origins of countries’ legal 
systems, and balance sheet variables. He also finds evidence that greater bank risk is associated 
with reductions in charter value.  
In summary, real estate investment by banks and BHCs can in theory have both positive 
and negative effects on bank performance as measured by risk, returns, and risk-adjusted returns. 
The net effect is an empirical question. Previous empirical studies have produced mixed results. 
Studies of U.S. thrifts’ real estate activity in the 1980s indicate that the negative effects have 
generally outweighed the positive effects. More recent studies typically find increased risk, lower 
risk-adjusted returns, or both when U.S. banks and BHCs engage in a range of non-traditional 
activities. Evidence from some international studies, however, do find improvements in risk and 
returns associated with lower restrictions on banking activities including, but not limited to, real 





We contribute additional evidence to this body of research by using market data from the 
last 20 years and looking at risk and return effects simultaneously and within the same 
framework. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects of real 
estate investment on U.S. BHC risk and returns without using a simulation. In addition, the 
approach taken in this study has two advantages over the methods followed in previous studies.  
First, we employ market-based, rather than accounting-based measures of risk and return. Market 
data are forward looking, incorporating investors’ beliefs about BHCs’ future prospects while 
accounting data are backwards looking, providing information on BHCs’ past conditions. 
Moreover, unlike accounting data, market data are not subject to managers’ “window dressing” 
of the results by, for example, spreading losses over time (smoothing). Additionally, if external 
factors are likely to impact BHC performance in the future, market-based risk measures are more 
likely than accounting-based measures to reflect them.  
Second, we use a GARCH framework, which allows us to examine the effects of real 
estate investment on return and volatility simultaneously, accounts for heteroskedastic errors and 
permits the persistence of shocks to returns to be measured. The GARCH model produces, for 
every period, estimates of the conditional variance of returns, which are interpreted as measures 
of BHCs’ total risk. This allows us to use quarterly accounting data on real estate investment (the 
only readily available and useful public data on BHC real estate investment) to estimate the 
effects of real estate investment on the market-based measures of total risk and return.  
3. Data  
Quarterly data on investment in real estate by BHCs are extracted from the BHC Reports 
available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Web site.  BHCs have reported figures on real 





runs from the third quarter of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 2010 (82 quarters). Of 4,187 
BHCs that filed Y9-C reports during this time period, 595 reported positive real estate 
investment for at least one quarter during the sample period. The subset of that group that is 
publicly traded and for which stock price information is available numbers 204.  
The real estate investment to total assets ratio (RE), measured in percent, is calculated for 
each BHC for every quarter that the necessary data appear in the Y-9C reports. Real estate 
investment data are extracted from series BHCK3656 (“Direct and Indirect Investments in Real 
Estate Ventures”) in those reports. They include real estate held for investment and development; 
loans secured by real estate that have virtually the same risks and rewards as the real estate used 
as security; investments in ventures that are primarily engaged in holding real estate for 
development or investment; and property originally acquired for future expansion but no longer 
intended for that purpose. Series BHCK3656 excludes real estate used for the operation of the 
BHC and its subsidiaries as well as real estate acquired to satisfy previously contracted debts, 
such as foreclosed-upon properties. Such real estate is reported, but it is excluded from this study 
because it is not acquired as a return-generating investment.  
Each BHC’s quarterly stock returns are calculated from monthly return data from the 
Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) by way of Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS).  Three pairs of portfolios of BHC stocks are formed in the following manner (Table 2 
summarizes the portfolio construction criteria). First, to determine whether BHC risk and return 
are influenced by BHC engagement in real estate investment, stocks of BHCs are divided into 
two portfolios called “INVEST” and “NO_INVEST.” In each quarter, the INVEST portfolio 
includes stocks of BHCs that report positive real estate investment in that quarter. The 





quarter. The compositions of the two portfolios change each quarter as BHCs’ start or stop 
investing in real estate.  
Second, two portfolios are formed in order to examine differences between BHCs that 
invest in real estate under lenient rules versus those that invest under strict rules. To this end, call 
report data are used to identify state non-member banks (SNMBs) in the 39 states and the 
District of Columbia that allow banks to either buy equity stakes in real estate, develop real 
estate, or both, and matched with Bank Holding Company data using identifiers common 
between these two data sets. BHCs that control SNMBs in this group and that invested in real 
estate are included in a portfolio called “LENIENT”, because such BHCs are able to invest in 
real estate under relatively lenient rules (rules on real estate investment are summarized in 
Section 1 and Table 1). The remaining BHCs control non-member banks (NMBs) falling under 
the relatively strict regulations of the National Bank Act, are SMBs under the relatively strict 
Regulation H, or are SNMBs that operate under similarly strict state rules (see Section 1). These 
BHCs that invested in real estate under relatively strict rules are included in a portfolio called 
“STRICT”. Again, the compositions of the two portfolios change each quarter as some BHCs 
begin investing in real estate under lenient or strict regulations and others stop doing so. 
Finally, we construct two portfolios to investigate whether greater investment in real 
estate is associated with greater or lesser BHC risk and return. To this end, BHCs that report 
positive investment in real estate are ranked each quarter by real estate to total assets ratio (RE). 
One of the two portfolios, called “HIGH_HALF,” includes BHCs with RE in the top half of the 
ranking.  The other portfolio, called “LOW_HALF,” includes BHCs with RE in the bottom half. 
Again, the composition of each portfolio changes each quarter as values of real estate held by 





Portfolio returns (R) are calculated by averaging individual stock returns plus dividends 
with equal weights on each stock. Using equal weights prevents the stocks of large BHCs from 
disproportionately affecting the results. Other authors who use equal weights in studies of BHC 
portfolios include Elyasiani and Mansur (1998) and Elyasiani, Mansur, and Pagano (2007). The 
real estate investment to total assets ratio (RE) of each portfolio in each quarter is calculated by 
averaging the RE of each stock in the portfolio in each quarter with an equal weight on each 
stock. The portfolio construction process filters out possible noise that would obscure the effects 
of real estate investment or real estate investment rules on a single stock’s returns and return 
volatility. This methodology is based on the assumption that the noise factors are not correlated 
with real estate investment. This process has been previously used in the literature by the authors 
cited earlier in this section.  
4.  Model and Methodology  
The modeling framework employed is an expanded generalized autoregressive 
conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) capital asset pricing model. GARCH models include 
equations for both conditional mean and conditional variance (volatility) of the dependent 
variable, which in this case is the return on a stock portfolio (R). GARCH specifications are 
frequently employed to model the behavior of financial time series such as stock returns because 
most of these series exhibit time-varying variances (Campbell & Hamao, 1992; Hamilton, 1994; 
Greene, 2003). This category of models allows investigation of the effects of changes in the real 
estate investment to total assets ratios (RE) on mean BHC stock returns as well as return 
volatility. We employ two GARCH (1,1) models. Model 1 includes the effect of RE on return 
and volatility, while Model 2 excludes RE and its interaction term with market.  





𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (1) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜙 + 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃2ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑡 (2) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1
′ ~𝐺𝐸𝐷  (3) 
In this model, the dependent variable is the quarterly return (R) on a portfolio of BHC stocks. 
The market return (𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇) in the mean equation is measured by the quarterly return on the 
market index constructed by CRSP.8  The coefficient βM, on the MARKET variable, is the 
portfolio’s market beta or systematic risk. The coefficient βRE, on the real estate investment ratio 
(RE), allows us to test whether changes in the portfolio return (R) are associated with changes in 
real estate investment. A positive (negative) and significant estimate of βRE is evidence that 
increases in RE are associated with higher (lower) BHC returns. We also include an interaction 
term between the MARKET and RE variables as a third regressor to investigate how an increase 
in RE affects the portfolio’s market beta, or conversely, how the general state of the market alters 
the effect of real estate investment on the BHC portfolio return. We orthogonalize the interaction 
variable (MARKET * RE) to purify it from the influences of its two components, which are 
already accounted for. Hence, the coefficient of the interaction variable (βINT) is viewed as a pure 
interaction effect.9 For example, a positive and significant βINT would indicate an increase in 
market risk due to real estate investment. Because we use portfolio returns, omitted firm specific 
effects are not a concern and cross-sectional regression approaches would not be appropriate.  
The GARCH (1,1) structure models return volatility as a linear function of the squared 
lagged error term (𝜀𝑡−1
2 ) (the ARCH effect) and the lagged volatility (ℎ𝑡−1) (the GARCH 
                                                 
8 This index includes all of the stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and the NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ). Each stock in the portfolio is given equal weight, 
and dividends are included in the returns. The quarterly return is calculated from CRSP monthly return data. 
9 To this end, we regress the interaction term on a constant, MARKET, and RE and use the residuals in the Model. 





effect).10 The approach enables the modeling of portfolio returns to reflect clustering of periods 
of high volatility and low volatility and persistence of shocks to the returns generating process. 
The real estate investment ratio (RE) is also included in the volatility equation to test whether 
increased real estate investment is associated with changes in the volatility (total risk). A positive 
estimate of this variable’s coefficient (θRE) is interpreted as evidence that greater real estate 
investment is associated with greater total risk and vice versa.  
The model parameters are estimated using the method of maximum likelihood (MLE) 
using the optimization algorithm of Broyden, Goldfarb, Fletcher, and Shanno (Broyden, 1970). 
Histograms in Appendix 1, and diagnostic statistics reported in Table 4, indicate that the 
distributions of returns for most of the portfolios have fatter tails than the normal distribution. In 
addition, the histograms show relatively large cusps, or flat regions, at the peaks of some of the 
distributions, the occurrence of which implies that more of the portfolio returns values are near 
the median than would be the case under normal distribution. For this reason the likelihood 
function is constructed using an error term that is assumed to follow the generalized error 
distribution (GED). The GED has a shape parameter, the estimates of which are reported in the 
tables of the regression results. When the shape parameter is equal to two, the GED is equivalent 
to the normal distribution.11  
MLE produces estimates of the portfolio return’s volatility (ht) for each period t, which is 
interpreted as the portfolio’s total risk in each period. A single-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pair 
signed-rank test (described e.g., in Berenson, Krehbiel, and Levine, 2006) is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the median difference in volatility between each two portfolios is zero against the 
                                                 
10 We tried to estimate other models, including EGARCH and GARCH-in-Mean (GARCH-M) models but, due to 
the relatively low frequency of the data, were unable to obtain estimates that converge using a variety of software 
that included RATS, SAS, and Stata. Ljung-Box test of the residuals and squared residuals of the fitted model (Table 
6) are not significant, indicating the models fit the data well.  





alternative that the median is positive. The Wilcoxon test of the medians, rather than the t-test of 
the means, is used because volatility distributions are skewed. Quarterly values of each 
portfolio’s Sharpe ratio are also calculated by dividing the portfolio’s quarterly return by the 
corresponding return standard deviation (the square root of the estimated return volatility). The 
Sharpe ratio is a measure of risk-adjusted returns and will be used to compare the risk-adjusted 
performance of the BHCs studied.  
Model 2, described by equation 4-6, excludes RE from both the mean and volatility 
equations as well as the interaction term MARKET*RE. Model 2 is estimated for portfolios of 
BHCs with zero real estate investment. This simpler model is used for estimation of the 
NO_INVEST portfolio return model, in which RE always takes the value of zero.  Model 2 is also 
estimated for the other five portfolios.12 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 (4) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜙 + 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃2ℎ𝑡−1 (5) 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡|Ω𝑡−1
′ ~𝐺𝐸𝐷 (6) 
5. Development of Hypotheses  
Estimation of models 1 and 2 for each portfolio allows us to test several hypotheses 
concerning comparative performance of BHCs that are involved in real estate investment, not-
involved, involved to a differential extent, or involved under differential regulatory constraints.  
These hypotheses are explained below and summarized in Table 2.  
5.1. Hypotheses on the Effect of Real Estate Investment on Returns 
                                                 
12 We also estimated additional models a) to include interest rate and exchange rate as additional regressors, b) to 
employ alternative volatility specifications, and c) to distinguish the stock market behavior during the recent crisis 
by introducing dummy variables. The algorithms for calculating MLE of these models frequently failed to converge, 
possibly because the number of model parameters is high relative to the number of observations (82). We also 
included the portfolio mean BHC size as a regressor in the volatility equation because volatility may be sensitive to 





Based on the existing research, described in Section 2, we expect that greater investment 
in real estate will be associated with lower or, at best, the same returns. Hence, the following 
three hypotheses are proposed: 
H1-RET: BHCs that invest in real estate have lower returns than BHCs that do not.  
H2-RET: Investment in real estate under relatively lenient rules is associated with lower 
returns than investment under relatively strict rules.  
H3-RET: Greater investment in real estate by BHCs is associated with lower returns.  
We test all three propositions by employing the Wilcoxon test. We test the null that the 
median difference in returns between portfolios (INVEST - NO_INVEST for H1-RET, LENIENT – 
STRICT for H2-RET, and HIGH_HALF – LOW_HALF for H3-RET) is zero against the alternative 
that it is negative. For H3-RET, we also use the sign and significance of the coefficient βRE in the 
mean equation within the GARCH framework (Model 1). If βRE is negative and significant, this 
is evidence that greater investment in real estate is associated with lower returns.  
5.2. Hypotheses on the Effect of Real Estate Investment on Risk 
 Real estate investment may increase or decrease BHC risk depending on whether the risk 
reduction from diversification into real estate is outweighed by greater risk of real estate 
investments, relative to traditional banking activities. Based on the most closely related research 
on thrifts in the 1980s, we conjecture that greater investment in real estate is associated with 
greater total risk.  Hence, we propose the following three hypotheses:  
H1-TR: BHCs that invest in real estate have greater total risk than BHCs that do not.  
H2-TR: BHCs that invest in real estate under relatively lenient regulations have greater 
total risk than BHCs that do so under relatively strict regulations.  





We test each of these hypotheses using the Wilcoxon procedure which compares the 
medians of the volatility of returns on the portfolios.  The null (alternative) hypotheses are that 
the difference in medians is zero (positive). Moreover, to put the differences in median total risk 
in economic terms, each portfolio’s median 1%, one-quarter Value at Risk (VaR) is calculated so 
that the potential losses on investments in the portfolios from unexpectedly bad quarters can be 
assessed. (For a detailed description of VaR and how it is calculated, see Appendix 2). In 
addition, the GARCH framework is used to test H3-TR. We test the null of zero effect on risk 
against the alternative of a risk increase. A positive and significant estimate of θRE, the 
coefficient of the real estate ratio (RE) in the volatility equation for each portfolio’s returns, is 
interpreted as evidence in support of this hypothesis.  
5.3: Hypotheses on the Effect of Real Estate Investment on Risk-Adjusted Returns: 
If greater investment in real estate is associated with lower returns, as proposed in H1-RET, 
and/or greater total risk, as proposed in H1-TR, then it follows that it will be associated also with 
lower risk–adjusted returns.  In this context, Stiroh (2004) has demonstrated that banks involved 
in non-traditional banking activities exhibit lower risk-adjusted returns. Thus, we propose the 
following three hypotheses.  
H1-RAR: BHCs that invest in real estate have lower risk-adjusted returns than BHCs that 
do not.  
H2-RAR: Investment in real estate under relatively lenient rules is associated with lower 
risk-adjusted returns than investment under relatively strict rules.  
H3-RAR: Greater investment in real estate by BHCs is associated with lower risk-adjusted 
returns. 
Again, the Wilcoxon procedure will be employed to conduct a test of the null hypothesis 
of zero median difference between risk-adjusted-returns of the corresponding portfolios against 





5.4 Investment in real estate and the level of BHC systematic risk 
Returns from real estate investment are sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations to a 
larger extent than returns from other assets. Indeed recessions during the recent years, e.g., the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, have been greatly associated with downturns in the real estate 
market (Leamer, 2007). Hence, an increase in real estate investment by a BHC is likely to 
heighten its market risk. Thus we propose: 
H1-MR: Greater investment in real estate by BHCs is associated with greater market risk.  
In our GARCH model, a shift in the market risk in response to increased real estate 
investment can be measured by the coefficient on the interaction term (MARKET*RE) in Model 
1 (βINT). A positive and significant βINT indicates an increase in market risk due to real estate 
investment and serves as evidence in favor of this hypothesis. This coefficient also shows how 
the effect of real estate investment on BHC return changes when the market improves.  
6. Empirical Results 
In this section, we discuss first accounting data on all BHCs that filed reports with the 
Federal Reserve, then descriptive statistics on the BHCs that filed reports with the Fed and had 
publicly traded stock, and then results of the analysis of return and risk of BHCs that had 
publicly traded stock.   
6.1 Financial Ratios on All BHCs Reporting to the Federal Reserve 
To complement our analysis, in Table 3, we present mean financial ratios for six 
categories of BHCs that filed reports with the Federal Reserve during the period of our study. 
The data come from Y-9 reports from second and fourth quarters only, because small BHCs file 
Y-9 reports only in those quarters. The financial ratios are consistent with greater risk and lower 





real estate under Fed regulation compared to those that invest under state regulation; and BHCs 
in the top half of the distribution of the real estate investment to total assets ratio when that 
distribution includes only BHCs that reported investment in real estate. BHCs that invest in real 
estate have lower capital ratios and higher loan loss ratios (greater risk) and lower return on 
equity and return on assets (lower returns) than BHCs that do not. Corresponding relationships 
for those four ratios hold between BHCs that invest in real estate under Fed regulation and those 
that invest under state regulation. Likewise, we see greater risk and lower returns for BHCs in 
the bottom half of the real estate ratio distribution relative to those in the top half of the 
distribution.  
6.2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 4 presents the summary statistics on total assets, real estate investment level, and 
real estate investment ratio for the BHCs that were listed in CRSP and invested in real estate 
during the period studied (1990:3-2010:4).  Total assets range from $96.2 million to $2.4 trillion 
with a mean of $89.1 billion. Its distribution is highly skewed to the right. The ratio of real estate 
investment to total assets (RE) ranges from zero to 4.54 percent with a mean value of 0.22 
percent. As described in Section 2, federal laws and some state laws strictly limit the types of 
real estate in which banks and BHCs may invest. Even in states with lenient rules, however, real 
estate investment is a small part of BHC portfolios.  
Descriptive statistics on the portfolios of BHCs described earlier (INVEST, NO_INVEST, 
LENIENT, STRICT and HIGH_HALF, LOW_HALF) are reported in Table 4. This table includes 
data on the quarterly mean total assets (Panel 2) and the quarterly mean real estate investment 
ratio (RE) (Panel 3) of the BHCs assembled in each portfolio. It is notable that the median of the 





than the corresponding $7.9 billion figure for the NO_INVEST portfolio. This reflects the fact 
that larger BHCs are more likely to invest in real estate than smaller BHCs. The BHCs that 
invested in real estate under lenient rules were also substantially larger than those that invested 
under strict rules with mean total assets of $72.0 billion and $15.4 billion, respectively.   
 The median real estate investment ratio (RE) for the INVEST and NO_INVEST portfolios 
are 0.229 and zero, respectively, because the latter includes only stocks of BHCs that do not 
invest in real estate. (Panel 3, Table 4.). The median RE values for the LENIENT and STRICT 
portfolios are 0.212 percent and 0.192 percent, respectively. For the HIGH_HALF and the 
LOW_HALF portfolios, the median RE values are 0.415 percent and 0.024 percent, respectively.  
Descriptive statistics on the quarterly portfolio return series are presented in Panel 4 of 
Table 4.  The mean return for INVEST, HIGH_HALF and LENIENT portfolios are lower and the 
standard deviation of their returns are higher than those of the NO_INVEST, LOW_HALF and 
STRICT portfolios, respectively. These figures indicate that greater involvement in real estate or 
real estate activity under more lenient regulations harm BHC performance.  In terms of 
diagnostics, Ljung-Box Q statistics for return and squared return series at 5 and 10 lags, reported 
in Panel 5, lead to rejection of the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the return and squared 
return series at high levels of significance, supporting the use of GARCH models. Jarque-Bera 
tests for normality and tests of skewness and kurtosis also both indicate that the return series are 
non-normal and skewed, further supporting GARCH modeling of the return series.  
6.3 Tests of Comparative Performance, Risk and Risk-Adjusted Returns 
 We employ two procedures to contrast the performance of portfolios of BHCs in terms of 
return, risk and risk-adjusted return: the non-parametric Wilcoxon procedure and the parametric 





that do and BHCs that do not engage in real estate investment, 2) BHCs that engage in real estate 
investment under lenient and strict regulatory restrictions and 3) BHCs in the top-half and 
bottom-half of the sub-sample of BHCs engaged in real estate investment.  
6.3.1. The INVEST versus the NO_INVEST Portfolios 
Wilcoxon test results for median differences in returns, risk, risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe 
Ratio) and value at risk (VaR) between INVEST versus NO_INVEST portfolios are reported in 
Table 5, panel A. The null hypothesis is that the median difference in these performance 
measures (D) between the two portfolios is zero (D = 0) against the alternative hypothesis of (D 
< 0) for returns and the Sharpe ratio (column 5), and (D > 0) for risk and VaR (column 4). In 
other words, the alternative hypothesis for returns is that engagement in real estate investment 
results in lower returns and lower risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio) while the alternative for 
risk and VaR is that engagement in real estate investment leads to greater risk and greater VaR.  
According to p-values reported in panel A, the null of equality of the performance indicators of 
interest can be rejected between the INVEST and NO_INVEST portfolios in all cases in favor of 
the respective alternative. These findings indicate that involvement in real estate lowers returns 
and risk-adjusted returns while it raises risk and VaR to a statistically significant scale. The 
positive effects of scale and scope economies, cost complementarity and possible increase in 
charter value of the BHCs that might arise from real estate investment appear to be dominated by 
the negative effects due to the lack of expertise of BHCs in this area of activity or the fact that 
they do not own enough real estate to diversify within this field of activity. These findings 
support H1_RET suggesting that investment in real estate lowers returns, H1-RAR proposing lower 
risk-adjusted returns and H1-TR, purporting higher risk for BHCs that do invest in real estate 





To put the difference in total risk in economic terms, the median difference in 1%, one-
quarter value at risk (VaR) for $1 million investments in the two portfolios is calculated. This 
figure stands at $32,151. The Wilcoxon test supports rejection of the hypothesis of equal 
medians in favor of the alternative that the median VaR of the INVEST portfolio is greater. At a 
little more than 3% of the portfolio value, the difference in median VaR is economically 
significant, because a 3% difference in potential bad-quarter losses would likely cause portfolio 
managers to select different securities.  
6.3.2. The LENIENT versus STRICT Portfolios 
Wilcoxon test results for the LENIENT versus STRICT portfolios are presented in Table 5 
Panel B. According to the p-values reported in this panel, the nulls of equality of the 
performance measures between the two portfolios are rejected in favor of the alternatives that the 
LENIENT portfolio has lower return and risk-adjusted return (column 5) and greater risk and 
VaR (column 4). These findings suggest that returns from real estate investment for resale or 
development are more volatile than returns on the few types of real estate investment allowed 
under the stricter rules. As a result, BHCs operating under lenient regulation on real estate 
investment did more poorly in terms of return performance and also had a greater risk, resulting 
in a lower Sharpe ratio. These findings support H2_RET and H2_TR, suggesting that relaxation of 
restrictions on real estate investment has a detrimental effect on returns and risk, respectively. 
Lenient real estate investment rules do create more opportunities for BHCs to take advantage of 
scale and scope economies and to increase their charter values, but they also provide BHCs more 
opportunities to exercise poor judgment in choosing real estate investments, resulting in lower 
returns and greater risk. In terms of economic value, the median difference in 1%, one-quarter 





test supports rejection of the hypothesis of equal medians in favor of the alternative that the 
median VaR of the INVEST portfolio is greater. At a little more than 1% of the portfolio value, 
the difference in median VaR is economically significant, as it would likely influence a portfolio 
manager’s security selection choices.  
6.3.3. The HIGH_HALF versus the LOW_HALF Portfolios 
Wilcoxon test results for the HIGH_HALF versus LOW_HALF Portfolios (BHCs in the 
top half and bottom half in terms of the real estate investment ratio (RE)) are presented in Table 
5, Panel C. According to p-values reported in columns 4 and 5, unlike the previous portfolios, in 
this case the nulls of equality of the performance measures between the two portfolios cannot be 
rejected. This suggests that once BHCs enter the field of real estate investment activity, greater 
levels of real estate investment, within the limited range of activity observed in our sample, does 
not significantly impact their return, risk or the Sharpe ratio. In other words, there are no gains or 
losses for BHCs from increased involvement in real estate. In this case, the positive effects of 
scale and scope economies, cost complementarity and possible increase in charter value of the 
BHCs that might arise from greater real estate investment appear to be counter-balanced by the 
negative effects due to the lack of expertise of BHCs in this area of activity. These findings 
contradict H3_RET and H3_TR suggesting that greater investment in real estate is associated with 
lower returns and greater risk, respectively. One explanation for the latter finding is that the risk 
reduction brought about by diversification in real estate is not significantly greater than or less 
than the greater variance of returns from real estate investments relative to alternative 
investments. It is also possible that the diversification reduces risk, but the BHC organization 






It is notable that the ratio of real estate investment to total assets (RE) in our sample is no 
greater than 4.54 percent. It is, therefore, possible that this scale of operation in real estate is too 
low to be profitable and that there exists a higher threshold level of real estate investment above 
which the gains would outweigh the losses, especially if BHCs become skilled in real estate 
investment over time. Our results do not reflect that effect.  
6.3.4. Test Results within the GARCH framework 
  Table 6 reports estimation results for the GARCH models. Simultaneous inclusion of 
the real estate investment effects on return and volatility is an advantage of the GARCH 
framework but it may also make separation of these two effects more difficult as one can pick up 
the other, resulting in lower significance of one effect or the lack of it altogether. Two features of 
the estimates are notable. First, the regularity conditions are satisfied for all five portfolios for 
which Model 1 is estimated as the sums of the ARCH and GARCH parameters (θ1 + θ2) are 
below 1. Hence, the variance process is second-order stationary.13 The sum (θ1 + θ2), which 
measures the persistence of the shocks received, lies between 0.745 and 0.961. Similarly, for the 
six portfolios for which Model 2 is estimated, this parameter sum ranges between 0.812 and 
0.98. According to these parameter values, the proportion of a shock that persists after four 
quarters is at least (0.745)4 or 30.8%.  
Model 1 is estimated for the five portfolios with varying values of the real estate 
investment ratio (RE): INVEST, LENIENT, STRICT, HIGH_HALF and LOW_HALF. This odel 
cannot be estimated for the NO_INVEST portfolio because the value of RE would always be 
zero. In these estimates, the real estate investment ratio (RE) is found to exhibit a negative and 
significant coefficient for the STRICT and HIGH_HALF portfolios, indicating lower returns in 
                                                 
13 Chi-square tests of the restriction θ1+θ2=1 were performed for each model estimate for each portfolio. In each 





response to increased real estate investment, with the remaining portfolios demonstrating 
insignificant coefficients. Lower returns on the HIGH_HALF and STRICT portfolios in response 
to greater real estate investment could occur if BHCs in these portfolios gave up more profitable 
investments when they increased the proportions of real estate in their portfolios, or if the other 
investments constituted a better niche for the bank. According to these results, the real estate 
investment ratio (RE) exerts an insignificant influence on the mean portfolio return for BHCs 
included in the INVEST portfolio, the portfolio of BHCs whose RE ratio falls below the median 
value, and LENIENT, the portfolio of BHCs operating in lenient real estate regulatory 
environments. The real estate investment ratio (RE) has no effect on the volatility (total risk) of 
any of the portfolios as the coefficient (θRE) is statistically insignificant. As said before, this may 
be because RE appears in both equations of the system. This may also be due to the limited 
number of observations in the sample (82 observations). 
The GARCH framework produces estimates for the market beta as well as the coefficient 
of the interaction term (MARKET * RE). The market beta (βM) measures the systematic risk of the 
portfolio while the interaction term coefficient (βINT) measures the shift in the systematic risk 
when the share of real estate investment relative to total assets (RE) strengthens or weakens in 
value. The coefficient estimates in Table 6 show that the market betas of all estimated portfolios 
are positive and significant at the 1% level in both Model 1 and Model 2. Although statistical 
tests for differences in the market betas of different portfolios are not possible because they are 
estimated within different models, comparisons of their values may be made. For Model 1, the 
market beta estimate for the HIGH_HALF portfolio (0.55) is greater than the market beta 
estimate for the LOW_HALF portfolio (0.45), indicating that the portfolio of BHCs with a greater 





between the level of real estate investment and market risk, which under hypothesis H3-MR is 
expected to be positive. For Model 2, the INVEST market beta (0.46) is 5 basis points greater 
than the NO_INVEST portfolio market beta (0.41), suggesting BHCs that invest in real estate 
have greater market risk than BHCs that do not. In both Models 1 and 2, the LENIENT 
portfolio’s market beta is greater than the STRICT portfolio market beta – 8 basis points greater 
for Model 1 (0.57 compared to 0.48) and 7 basis points greater for Model 2 (0.51 compared to 
0.44). Although this result is not from a formal test, it suggests that less-regulated real estate 
investment is associated with greater market risk than strictly regulated real estate investment.  
The interaction term coefficient (βINT) is positive and significant for the INVEST, 
LENIENT, and HIGH_HALF portfolios and insignificant for LOW_HALF and LENIENT 
portfolios. This means that for the BHCs included in the former three portfolios, real estate 
activity heightens their systematic risk (market beta). The positive coefficients for the INVEST 
and HIGH_HALF portfolios imply that for the average BHC that invests in real estate, greater 
real estate investment increases market risk and that this effect is due to BHCs ranked in the top 
50 percent for real estate investment. The positive result for the LENIENT portfolio implies that 
under relatively lenient state rules, increases in real estate investment are associated with greater 
market risk. Contrary to these, for BHCs with relatively small investments in real estate or those 
operating under strict regulatory constraints, increases in real estate investment have no 
significant effect on market risk, as the coefficients on the LOW_HALF portfolio and the STRICT 
portfolio are statistically insignificant. An alternative interpretation of the positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction terms is that as the general market rises, the effect of increased real 







We examine the effect of real estate investment on the risk, returns, and risk-adjusted 
returns of U.S. BHCs between 1990 and 2010. The analysis is performed by forming portfolios 
of BHC stocks according to BHCs’ engagement and non-engagement in real estate investment, 
leniency versus strictness of regulations on BHC real estate activity and the BHC real estate 
investment to total asset ratios. Tests for differences in portfolio returns, risks risk-adjusted 
returns (Sharpe ratios) and Value-at-Risk (VaR) are conducted using the Wilcoxon test 
procedure as well as employing the generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) capital asset pricing model. Total risk and systematic risk are both considered.  
Our results provide evidence that the benefits of allowing BHCs to invest in real estate, 
which could stem from diversification of cash flows, economies of scale, economies of scope, or 
increased charter value, are outweighed by the greater volatility of returns that could come from 
the greater volatility of real estate prices, BHCs’ possible lack of expertise in real estate 
investment, or their inability to diversify within this field of activity because of their limited 
scale of operation in this area.  In particular, based on the Wilcoxon test procedure, BHCs that do 
invest in real estate have lower returns and greater risk than BHCs that do not. In other words, 
mere engagement of the BHCs in real estate investment is associated with poor performance 
relative to BHCs’ non-investment in real estate.  
Similarly, BHCs which operate under lenient regulatory restrictions on real estate activity 
demonstrate lower return and greater risk than BHCs operating under strict rules. Our results 
show that BHCs operating under the regulatory environment allowing investment purchase of 
real estate for development or equity stakes in real estate have lower returns and risk-adjusted 
returns and greater risk than BHCs that invest in real estate under relatively strict rules. For 





because real estate investment appears to be associated with undesirable consequences on BHC 
risk and return. If real estate investment is indeed allowed, it may be optimal for the regulators to 
impose additional capital requirements on this activity to prevent its unjustified growth. 
Our GARCH results indicate that investment in real estate is associated with lower 
returns and greater risk for portfolios of BHCs that make the greatest investments in real estate as 
a proportion of their total assets (HIGH_HALF). This finding does not, however, extend to the 
portfolio of BHCs with below-median real estate investment ratios. For this latter portfolio, 
greater investment in real estate results in statistically identical returns, risk and risk-adjusted 
returns. Our GARCH results also indicate that increases in real estate investment increase market 
risk for portfolios of BHCs that invest in real estate versus those that do not, BHCs that invest 
the most in real estate versus those that invest the least, and BHCs that invest in real estate under 
relatively lenient rules versus those that operate under strict rules.  
It is notable, however, that our results do not rule out the existence of a threshold of real 
estate investment beyond which BHCs would exhibit improved performance. None of the BHCs 
in the current sample invest more than 4.6 percent of their total assets in real estate, leaving the 
possibility that BHCs may not be investing enough in this area to develop expertise and to 
benefit from significant scale and scope economies, diversification within the specialization or 
increased charter value. A possible avenue for future research would thus be to examine the risk 
and return profiles of banks in other countries where real estate investment comprises a greater 
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Table 1  
Panel A: Real Estate Investment Rules for U.S. BHCs and Banks 
Institution Type Rules 
Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) Only with permission of Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
National Banks (NBs) 
Allowed for the following:  
 Payment for loans (five-year time limit on such ownership) 
 Acquired as a result of a default. 
State Fed-member Banks (SMBs) Only with permission of Federal Reserve Board of Governors 
State Fed-non-member Banks (SNMBs) 
Varies according to state as follows: 
 
States that allow equity ownership:  
Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota 
 
States that allow development: 
New Mexico, South Carolina, Wyoming 
 
States that allow ownership and development: 
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
 
States that do not allow real estate activity: 
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Vermont 
This table summarizes rules on real estate investment for bank holding companies (BHCs) and banks in the United 
States. Although it is not specified in each row of the table above, all U.S. BHCs and banks are allowed to own real 




Panel B: Portfolio Descriptions 
Portfolio Name Criteria for Inclusion 
HIGH_HALF (LOW_HALF ) 
 
BHC reports investing in real estate during the quarter; real estate investment to total assets 




BHC reports positive (zero) investment in real estate during the quarter. 
 
LENIENT (STRICT)) 
BHC reports investing in real estate during the quarter; BHC does (does not) control a 
subsidiary bank that may invest in real estate under rules that allow equity purchases of real 












Hypothesis statement Supported? 
H1-RET 













BHCs that invest in real estate under relatively lenient rules have lower returns 




BHCs that invest in real estate under relatively lenient rules have greater total risk 




BHCs that invest in real estate under relatively lenient rules have lower risk-

















Panel B. Hypotheses Concerning Systematic Risk: The GARCH Procedure 
H3-MR 
Greater investment in real estate by BHCs is associated with greater market risk. 
 
Supported? 
Portfolio INVEST YES 
Portfolio NO-INVEST NO 
Portfolio LENIENT YES 
Portfolio STRICT NO 
Portfolio HIGH-HALF YES 
Portfolio LOW_HALF NO 
 
Table 3 
Financial Ratios on All BHCs Reporting to the Federal Reserve (1990:4 to 2010:4) 
 BHCs that 
invest in real 
estate 
BHCs that 
don’t invest in 
real estate 
BHCs that 










of real estate 
ratio 
distribution 




Cap. Ratio  0.0863 0.0882 0.0870 0.0860 0.0878 0.0847 
LL Ratio 0.0037 0.0027 0.0035 0.0037 0.0034 0.0039 
ROE 0.0424 0.0521 0.0790 0.0272 0.0434 0.0414 





N 3,106 56,724 914 2,192 1,545 1,561 
Note: This table presents mean financial ratios for six categories of BHCs that filed Y-9 reports with the Federal 
Reserve between the fourth quarter of 1990 and the fourth quarter of 2010. The data come from second and fourth 
quarter reports, because small BHCs file Y-9 reports only in those quarters. “Cap. Ratio” is the equity capital ratio, 
equity capital divided by total assets; LL Ratio is the loan and lease loss provision ratio, loan and lease loss 
provisions divided by total assets; ROE is the return on equity, net income divided by equity capital; and ROA is 
return on assets, net income divided by total assets. The two rightmost columns contain mean ratios for two 
categories of BHCs that reported investment in real estate – those in the top half of the quarterly real estate ratio 
(real estate investment to total assets) distribution and those in the bottom half of the real estate ratio distribution. 




Descriptive Statistics on BHCs & Portfolios in Sample of Stock Issuers (1990:3 to 2010:4) 
 
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
Panel 1: Bank Holding Companies in sample 
Total Assets ($millions) 3,002 89,137 1,232,907 96,227 2,366,087 292,581 
Real Estate Investment ($millions) 3,002 160.3 0 1.0 7,878.1 776.1 
Real Estate Investment Ratio (%) 3,002 0.22 0 2.12×10-5 4.54 0.38 
Panel 2: Portfolio Mean Total Assets ($millions, quarterly observations) 
INVEST  82 130,890  55,589     17,564    453,635   129,356  
NO_INVEST 82     8,852  7,907     5,568       17,970        3,128 
LENIENT  82 221,630  71,998    17,467  1,068,064    254,768  
STRICT  82   31,208  15,414      3,876     113,726     31,108  
HIGH_HALF  82 116,779  42,610       6,685     547,467   135,633  
LOW_HALF  82 145,638  69,860    22,438     475,993    131,051  
Panel 3: Portfolio Real Estate Investment to Total Assets Ratio (RE) (%, quarterly observations)  
INVEST  82 0.218 0.229 0.127 0.463 0.075 
NO_INVEST 82 0 0 0 0 0 
LENIENT  82 0.233 0.212 0.132 0.501 0.086 
STRICT  82 0.207 0.192 0.082 0.371 0.086 
HIGH_HALF  82 0.427 0.415 0.237 0.901 0.140 
LOW_HALF  82 0.034 0.024 0.009 0.100 0.023 
Panel 4: Portfolio Mean Quarterly Returns  (quarterly observations) 
INVEST 82 0.028 0.041 0.118 -0.363 0.272 
NO_INVEST 82 0.033 0.042 0.093 -0.235 0.212 
LENIENT 82 0.021 0.042 0.135 -0.475 0.295 
STRICT 82 0.038 0.037 0.106 -0.308 0.231 
HIGH_HALF 82 0.027 0.049 0.122 -0.486 0.246 
LOW_HALF 82 0.029 0.03 0.123 -0.347 0.333 
Panel 5: Portfolio Mean Quarterly Returns Series (quarterly observations) 
  N J-B (MSL) Skewness Kurtosis Q(10) Q2(10) 
INVEST 82 0.00*** -1.164*** 2.411*** 12.962 32.133*** 





LENIENT 82 0.00*** -1.485*** 3.878* 14.554 28.198*** 
STRICT 82 0.00*** -0.742*** 1.164*** 13.842 25.300*** 
HIGH_HALF 82 0.00*** -1.628*** 4.469*** 15.573 25.378*** 
LOW_HALF 82 0.02** -0.466* 1.23* 9.949 31.736*** 
Note: Portfolios are described in Table 1. J-B is the Jarque-Bera joint normality test statistic. MSL stands for marginal 
significance level. Kurtosis figures are in excess of three. Q(10) and Q2(10) are the Ljung-Box statistics for the 10th order 
autocorrelations in return and squared return series. The critical values at the 5% level for 10, 20, and 30 degrees of freedom 




Wilcoxon Tests of Median Differences  
Variable Median Difference (D) Test Statistic (W) 
p-value 
HA: D > 0 
p-value 
HA: D < 0 
Panel A: INVEST and NO_INVEST (1990:3 to 2010:4) 
Model 2 Results 
Return -0.006 -1.264 0.90 0.10 
Total Risk  0.001586 6.521 0.00 >0.99 
VaR  $32,151 6.886 0.00 >0.99 
Sharpe Ratio  -0.1843 -2.489 0.99 0.01 
Panel B: LENIENT and STRICT (1990:3 to 2010:4) 
Model 1 Results 
Return -0.011 -2.129 0.98 0.02 
Total Risk  0.0003627 1.727 0.04 0.96 
VaR  $12,141 3.474 0.00 >0.99 
Sharpe Ratio  -0.146 -1.431 0.92 0.08 
Model 2 Results 
Return -0.011 -2.129 0.98 0.02 
Total Risk  0.001228 2.420 0.01 0.99 
VaR  $15,777 3.049 0.00 0.99 
Sharpe Ratio  -0.1503 -2.110 0.98 0.02 
Panel C: HIGH_HALF and LOW_HALF (1990:3 to 2010:4) 
Model 1 Results 
Return 0.001 0.178 0.43 0.57 
Total Risk  0.0001775 -0.685 0.25 0.75 
VaR $7,448 0.243 0.40 0.60 
Sharpe Ratio -0.0278 -0.460 0.68 0.32 
Model 2 Results 
Return 0.001 0.178 0.43 0.57 
Total Risk  0.0005753 0.485 0.31 0.69 
VaR  $7,0003 -2.790 0.45 0.55 
Sharpe Ratio  0.07117 0.918 0.18 0.82 
Note: These tables present results of Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-rank tests of median differences. Each row 
presents the results of tests of the null hypothesis that the median difference in the series is zero against two 
alternative hypotheses: 1) that the difference is positive and 2) that the difference is negative. Differences are 
calculated by subtracting the value for the portfolio listed first from the portfolio listed second. Each row presents 
test results as follows: “Return” for portfolio returns, “Total Risk” for the estimated conditional variance of returns; 
“VaR” for the 1%, one-quarter portfolio Value at Risk; and “Sharpe Ratio” for the portfolio Sharpe ratio (returns 
divided by conditional standard deviations). Model 1 results are not presented in Panel A because Model 2 cannot 
be estimated for the NO_INVEST portfolio. All values of the real estate investment to total assets ratio (RE) are zero 
for that portfolio. The p-values in bold are associated with the alternative hypothesis of primary concern in the main 










Table 6: GARCH Estimates (1990:3 to 2010:4)  
  Panel A: Model 1 Panel B: Model 2 














α Intercept 0.05 0.02 0.08** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 
  (1.43) (0.80) (2.12) (69.95) (2.40) (2.25) (3.15) (1.62) (2.96) (2.26) (2.19) 
βM MARKET 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.55*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.41*** 0.51*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 
  (6.56) (7.02) (5.24) (5.66) (5.32) (5.61) (6.18) (5.54) (6.72) (5.33) (5.36) 
βRE RE -0.14 -0.03 -0.29* -0.15*** -0.27       
  (-0.90) (-0.24) (-1.73) (-65.75) (-0.95)       
βINT MARKET*RE 2.15*** 1.75*** 0.49 0.85*** -4.84       
  (2.67) (2.69) (0.24) (2.23) (-1.30)       
Φ ARCH(0) 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00** 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00* 1.00 1.00 1.00 
 (×10-3) (0.57) (1.08) (0.90) (2.14) (1.55) (1.28) (1.15) (1.87) (0.91) (1.12) (1.51) 
θ1 ARCH(1) 0.31 0.32** 0.14 0.14 0.54*** 0.44** 0.44 0.34** 0.47 0.44* 0.51*** 
  (1.60) (2.30) (0.96) (0.86) (2.56) (2.13) (1.59) (2.21) (1.28) (1.72) (2.54) 
θ2 GARCH(1) 0.56*** 0.45*** 0.61*** 0.66*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.44*** 
  (3.64) (2.54) (2.38) (5.22) (3.12) (3.32) (2.56) (2.94) (2.88) (3.88) (3.44) 
θRE RE 0.00 -2.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00       
  (0.00) (-0.21) (-0.56) (0.17) (-0.59)       
 SHAPE 1.31*** 1.19*** 1.73*** 1.95*** 1.04*** 1.14*** 1.05*** 1.19*** 1.46*** 1.22*** 0.99*** 
  (3.82) (4.51) (3.98) (4.62) (3.47) (3.45) (4.25) (4.53) (3.84) (3.38) (3.52) 
θ1+ θ2 ARCH+GARCH 0.87 0.77 0.75 0.80 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.81 0.98 0.94 0.95 
Model Diagnostics 
 Log Likelihood 89.53 80.44 90.07 88.32 81.35 86.71 102.08 78.58 87.79 86.06 79.74 
 Q(5) 0.37 0.77 0.10 0.15 0.71 0.32 0.09 0.22 0.29 0.10 0.70 
 Q2(5) 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.04 0.00 
 No. of Obs. 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 
This table presents parameter estimates for two GARCH(1,1) models of the quarterly returns on portfolios of BHC stocks, Model 1: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡             (1) 
ℎ𝑡
2 = 𝜙 + 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃2ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑅𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑡                                                              (2) 
and Model 2: 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                             (3) 
ℎ𝑡
2 = 𝜙 + 𝜃1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃2ℎ𝑡−1                                                                                 (4) 
The models are estimated using the method of maximum likelihood under the assumption that the error term follows the generalized error distribution 
(GED). Rt is the portfolio return, MARKETt is the return on the market portfolio, REt is the mean real estate investment to total assets ratio of the BHCs in 
the portfolio in period t, and MARKET*REt is an orthogonalized interaction of MARKETt and REt. Portfolios are formed as described in Section 4. Data 
cover the period from the 3rd quarter of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 2010. t-values are in parentheses. Q(5) and Q2(5) are the Ljung-Box test 
statistics for the 5th order autocorrelation for standardized and squared standardized residuals. The critical values at the 5% level for 10, 20, and 30 





Appendix 1 – Portfolio Return Histograms  
        
 
 
        
 
 





































































































Appendix 2 – Value at Risk (VaR) 
Value at Risk (VaR) can be viewed as the most that an investor could expect to lose from 
a financial position during a given time period for a given probability. A stock portfolio’s 1%, 
one-quarter VaR is the amount by which the value of an investment in the portfolio would 
change if the portfolio’s realized quarterly return equals the first percentile of its expected return 
distribution. For example, if the first percentile of the expected return distribution is -5%, the 
change in the value of a $1 million investment in the portfolio is expected to be no worse than a 
decline of $50,000 on 99% of all trading days. The expected return distribution of a portfolio 
with high total risk has a low first percentile because the distribution has a large variance and, 
thus, a wide distribution of possible returns. A portfolio with high total risk is, therefore, subject 
to high losses in unusually “bad” quarters and, thus, has a greater VaR. 
For this study, portfolios’ expected return distributions are calculated under the 
assumption that they are normal with mean equal to the estimated model’s predicted return and 
variance equal to the estimated conditional variance, or total risk, for that quarter. The formula 
for VaR under these assumptions is: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 = 𝐼 × (𝑅?̂? + 𝑧ℎ𝑡) 
where I is the initial value of the investment, 𝑅?̂? is the predicted return, z is the value of the 
standard normal distribution at the desired percentile, and ht is the standard deviation of the 
expected return distribution. Suppose a portfolio’s predicted return for the quarter is 0.1 percent 
with estimated conditional standard deviation of 0.0006. Then the 1%, one-quarter VaR on a $1 
million investment would be: 𝑉𝑎𝑅 = $1,000,000 × (0.001 + (−2.32 × 0.006)) = −$12,920. 
 The negative sign on VaR indicates that the change in portfolio value would be a loss. In 
the empirical analysis in Section 6, the absolute value of the VaR is reported. 
